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ABSTRACT 
Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument is an attempt to prove that no agent can meet the 
demands for true moral responsibility.  The Basic Argument proceeds on the assumption that, in 
order for an agent to be truly morally responsible for her actions, she must be truly responsible 
for her reasons for performing those actions, which Strawson contends is impossible since it 
requires an infinite regress of truly responsible decisions to have the reasons one has.  In my 
thesis, I take issue with the Basic Argument.  I argue that, contrary to Strawson’s claims, the 
Basic Argument is not persuasive to those who reject that one’s reasons cause one’s actions.  For 
those who are willing to overlook this shortcoming, I then argue that it is possible for an agent to 
evade the threat of infinite regress, particularly in situations where two simultaneous choices (at 
least partially) explain each other. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The Project 
Do we, as rational agents, ever act freely?  Are we ever morally responsible for our 
actions and/or choices?  Is there a relationship between an agent’s acting freely and her being 
morally responsible?  These are some of the basic questions with which the so-called free will 
debate is concerned.  The debate is complicated both by what we know and what we do not 
know about humans, the mind, and the world at large.  On the one hand, there is our first-hand, 
subjective experience—our phenomenology—which strongly suggests that a great many things 
we do are under our direct control.  On the other hand, many of us subscribe to what we consider 
scientific and objective facts about the world, facts that indicate a world in which causal laws 
may dictate everything that does and does not happen.  Are the two views commeasurable?  
Must our assumptions about one or the other be reconsidered or abandoned? 
Galen Strawson argues that that free will and moral responsibility do not exist.  
Interestingly, he also claims that many of the issues with which the free will debate is typically 
concerned—issues of causation, the relationship of the mind to the body, etc.—need not be 
resolved before the non-existence of free will and moral responsibility can be proven.  
Strawson’s argument relies on two very simple ideas.  The first is that to act freely just means to 
act in a way for which one can properly be said to be truly morally responsible for one’s action.  
The second notion is that, to be truly morally responsibly for one’s action, one must be (in some 
respects, at least) truly responsible for the reasons that lead to performing that action.  
Strawson’s rejection of free will and moral responsibility is tied to this second criterion.  The 
criterion, Strawson contends, is impossible to meet, because it requires that an agent be truly 
responsible—or self-determined, as he sometimes puts it—in either the beliefs or the desires that 
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make up the agent’s reasons for performing the action in question.  This in turn is supposedly 
impossible because it requires an infinite regress of choices to have the reasons one has.  
Because the self-determination of reasons is impossible, says Strawson, true moral responsibility 
is impossible, and by the definition of freedom which Strawson himself provides, no agent ever 
acts freely. 
In what follows, I will argue against Strawson.  I will focus first on undermining a key 
assumption upon which Strawson’s entire argument is based—that the reasons an agent has for 
performing an action cause the agent to perform that action.  As will be shown, this causal 
assumption is the primary motivation for Strawson’s ultimate rejection of self-determined, and 
hence truly morally responsible, actions.  Once doubt is cast over the causal efficacy of an 
agent’s reasons, I will argue that the first move in Strawson’s argument is inadequately 
supported, and as such, that his entire argument is suspect.  Still, for those who are willing to 
overlook this flaw, I will proceed to tackle the problem of infinite regress that is the heart of 
Strawson’s argument.  I will do so by focusing on cases where an agent chooses not to take some 
course of action she considers equally appealing to another course of action she does decide to 
take.  In these types of cases, what an agent chooses not to do will be explainable primarily by 
reference to the fact that the agent chose to do something else.  This choosing to do something 
else will serve as a genuine, non-regressive reason for the agent’s “forfeiture” of the other course 
of action under consideration, thereby staving off the infinite regress that underlies Strawson’s 
argument for the impossibility of true moral responsibility. 
Here is how my thesis shall unfold.  After setting forth some useful definitions at the end 
of chapter 1, I will in chapter 2 explicate Strawson’s argument for the impossibility of freedom 
and moral responsibility.  In chapter 3, I will examine the role that reasons, as the primary 
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components of rational action, play in explaining an agent’s actions.  Strawson’s belief that an 
agent’s reasons cause her actions will be explored, followed by an alternative view of reasons 
based largely on the work of Carl Ginet.  Siding with Ginet, I will argue that an agent’s reasons 
can rationally explain her actions without assuming that those reasons cause those actions.  In 
light of this non-causal account of reasons, I will contend that the first move in Strawson’s 
argument is questionable. 
In chapter 4, I will seek to establish that the forfeiture of an action is, in at least some 
cases, immune to Strawson’s concerns of infinite regress.  I begin by making it clear that these 
forfeitures are genuine actions, performed for reasons and susceptible to moral evaluation.  I then 
argue that, although these forfeitures often appear together with a commitment to do something 
else, the forfeiture and the commitment cannot be regarded as one and the same choice.  
Consequently, the commitment itself can provide a genuine reason for the forfeiture, and the 
forfeiture can provide a genuine reason for the commitment.  Infinite regress is thereby avoided, 
since neither the commitment nor the forfeiture can be explained wholly by reasons that precede 
the agent’s decision.  With a causal account of reasons having been dismissed in chapter 3 and 
the problem of infinite regress successfully circumvented, I will then argue that some action 
forfeitures and commitments should remain eligible candidates for being truly morally 
responsible actions, since Strawson’s argument will no longer pose any obvious threats. 
I will conclude this thesis by addressing some potential objections and offering some 
final thoughts on the meaning of free will and moral responsibility in chapter 5. 
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1.2 Some Preliminary Definitions 
In this thesis, the issue of determinism that characteristically dominates the free will 
debate will largely be eschewed, since Strawson himself believes the truth or falsity of 
determinism has no bearing on his argument.  Time and again, Strawson asserts that his 
objection to freedom and true moral responsibility holds regardless of one’s position in the 
debate about the compatibility of freedom and determinism, and even regardless of one’s theory 
of mind.  Still, it will be useful to provide definitions for several common terms surrounding the 
traditional debates about determinism, since failing to take these concepts into account would at 
certain junctures prove irresponsible.  The terms to be defined are as follows: determinism, 
indeterminism, compatibilism, incompatibilism, and libertarianism.1 
Determinism is the theory that, given whatever natural laws exist (be they physical laws, 
psychological laws, some other kinds of laws, or any combination of the above) and given the 
actual history of the world, there is one and only one realizable future.  In simpler terms, because 
of the laws of the universe and because of the way things were and are, whatever happens is 
necessitated by the past. 
Indeterminism is, appropriately enough, the theory that, given the way things actually are 
(including any laws that may hold and the way the world has been up until now), there are at 
least two genuinely realizable futures.  In short, indeterminism states that determinism is false. 
Compatibilism is the theory that it is possible both for an agent to act freely and for 
determinism to be true.  That is, compatibilism is the theory that the truth of determinism is 
compatible with an agents’ possessing free will.  Typically, a philosopher is identified as a 
compatibilist if she believes that determinism is true and that agents do possess free will, but this 
need not be the case.  So long as one does not recognize an inherent conflict between 
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determinism and free will, one is a compatibilist.  In theory, then, a compatibilist may believe 
that determinism is false, that agents are unfree, but that determinism and free will are 
compatible nonetheless.  A compatibilist may even be an agnostic concerning whether or not 
agents do exist who possess free will, whether determinism is true, or both. 
Incompatibilism is the theory that determinism and free will cannot co-exist.  Ergo, the 
incompatibilist believes that if determinism is true, then there are no agents with free will.  
Similarly, the incompatibilist must assert that if an agent (even just one agent) has free will (or 
acts freely, even once), then determinism is false.  As was the case with compatibilism, this does 
not obligate the incompatibilist to a particular stance on either free will or determinism, other 
than to the conditional claims just laid out.  In short, then, there are two primary positions the 
non-agnostic incompatibilist may take: (1) that at least some agents act freely on at least some 
occasions (and thus that determinism is false), or (2) that determinism is true (and thus that 
nobody ever acts freely).2 
Libertarianism is the theory occupied by position (1), while hard determinism occupies 
position (2).  Libertarians believe that at least some agents do sometimes act freely, and that 
incompatibilism is true.  It follows that all libertarians are indeterminists.  It is safe to say that, 
for libertarians, at least some (if not most) of the indeterminism about the future is based on the 
fact that agents do have free will.  The where, what, when, and even if of my eating a meal one 
year in the future is largely undetermined, primarily because it is genuinely within my power to 
realize multiple courses of action, both a year from now and in the interim.  Even if I can make 
only one choice at any given moment, and even if that choice is severely limited by 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 Strawson provides a similar account in §1.3 of Freedom and Belief (5-7). 
2 The rare incompatibilist may exist who believes that indeterminism is true but that no agent has free will.  In such a 
case, the non-existence of agential freedom will be explained by something other than the truth or falsity of 
determinism. 
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circumstances beyond my control, there are situations—perhaps quite a lot of them—wherein I 
am in no way bound to do any one particular thing.  For this reason, libertarianism is sometimes 
dubbed a “robust” form of free will.  Unlike the free will that is sometimes espoused by 
compatibilists, libertarian free will relies on the notion that an agent is not (or at least not always) 
determined to choose one way or another. 
Hard determinists are incompatibilists who hold that determinism is true, and thus that we 
do not have free will.  Though Strawson may be regarded as a hard determinist, he argues that 
indeterminism is equally incompatible with free will and moral responsibility.  Derk Pereboom 
subscribes to this position, calling it hard incompatibilism (Fischer et al., 2007: 85).  But 
Strawson’s view is even stronger than Pereboom’s in that Strawson denies the very possibility of 
genuine moral responsibility, whereas Pereboom believes it is possible but not actual.  Let it 
suffice to say that Strawson does not attempt to situate himself within the traditional categories 
of the debate, identifying himself only as a disbeliever in free will and moral responsibility.  He 
takes no position on whether or not determinism is true, and he does not believe this bears in any 
way upon the efficacy of his argument. 
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2 Strawson’s Basic Argument 
2.1 The Two Requirements of Freedom and Moral Responsibility 
Galen Strawson purports that “to be a free agent is to be capable of being truly 
responsible for one’s actions” (1986: 1).  Moreover, he asserts that “to be capable of being truly 
responsible for one’s actions is to be capable of being truly deserving of praise and blame for 
them” (ibid.).  For Strawson, then, to be free in one’s actions and to be truly morally responsible 
for those actions are one and the same.3  In Freedom and Belief, he states from the outset that 
“the word ‘free’ will be used interchangeably with the phrase ‘truly responsible.’  Questions 
about what freedom is, and about whether or not we are or could be free, will be understood to 
be questions about what true responsibility is, or might be, and about whether we are or could be 
truly responsible or truly deserving of praise or blame” (2).  Strawson claims this true moral 
responsibility is unattainable because an agent can never be responsible for the reasons that lead 
her to act as she does. 
Strawson contends that in order for a person to be truly morally responsible for 
performing some action A, two criteria must be met.  First, action A must belong to the class of 
rational actions—that is, “actions that are performed for a reason (as opposed to ‘reflex’ actions 
or mindlessly habitual actions)” (2003: 212).  Put into more common vernacular, action A must 
be an action that is done on purpose.  Strawson does not dwell on this requirement, but it is 
important to keep in mind since these are the kinds of action that typically fall under the 
moralistic microscope.  When actions are known to be involuntary, we are not inclined to ascribe 
moral responsibility to those who instantiate them, regardless of the consequences that follow.  
That is, even if some situation existed wherein my flinching at a fastball that narrowly misses my 
                                                 
3 Hereafter, I will not always include the qualifier “moral” or “morally” when speaking of true moral responsibility.  
The qualifier may be assumed. 
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face could bring about cataclysmic results, no reasonable person would hold me accountable for 
flinching.  Similarly, Strawson is concerned only with those actions that an agent performs 
intentionally, and a key indicator that an action was intentional is that an agent had conscious 
reasons for performing it.4 
The second criterion is more complex.  Strawson claims that the person performing 
action A must be self-determined in her action if she is to be held truly responsible for it, because 
“true responsibility presupposes true self-determination” (1986: 26).  But to be self-determined 
in one’s action, according to Strawson, one must be self-determined in one’s reasons for so 
acting.  Hence, it is the origin of one’s reasons that ultimately make or break that person’s 
freedom.  If a person is self-determined in her reasons, then she may be regarded as self-
determined in the actions that those reasons produce, and she is thereby a candidate for true 
moral responsibility.  If she is not self-determined in her reasons, she cannot act in such a way 
that she is truly morally responsible for her actions.  The question, then, is how one can be self-
determined in one’s reasons.  On Strawson’s account, a person is self-determined if one has 
“consciously and explicitly chosen to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, 
and […] succeeded in bringing it about that one is that way” (2003: 213; cf. 1986: 28).  Put more 
simply, a person is self-determined in her reasons if she is truly responsible, to some extent at 
least, for having those reasons in the first place. 
 
2.2 The Impossibility of Self-Determination 
Strawson believes the kind of self-determination requisite for true moral responsibility is 
impossible to achieve.  For Strawson it appears obvious that agents cannot be the authors of their 
                                                 
4 Some might argue that a person can act freely and/or be morally responsible for actions that are done involuntarily, 
provided that certain conditions exist (e.g. the agent is responsible for being in a position where such an action was 
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own reasons, those “principles of choice” or “preferences, values, pro-attitudes, ideals” and the 
like that constitute one’s mental character and bring about the choices one makes (1986: 29; cf. 
2003: 213).  Furthermore, these principles of choice—which Strawson claims may be broadly 
lumped into one of two categories: desires and beliefs—seem to give a full account of one’s 
choices, such that no further explanation is necessary for why an agent acted as she did other than 
pointing to her reasons; an agent’s rational actions are “fully explicable by reference to” her 
desires and beliefs (1995: 18).5  Because an agent’s reasons will provide a full explanation of 
any rational action she performs, the only way an agent can be truly responsible for her actions i
if she is self-determined in her beliefs and/or her desires.  But Strawson does not think an agent 
can be responsible for either her beliefs or her desir
s 
es. 
                                                                                                                                                            
Take beliefs.  Strawson does not think anyone should expect, or even desire, to be self-
determined in regard to beliefs, since the primary aim of having beliefs is that they correspond 
with reality—that is, that they be true.  If we want our beliefs to be true beliefs, which seems a 
given,6 then we will not want our beliefs to be determined by anything other than reality, not 
even by “the self.”  In fact, even if self-determination were possible for beliefs, it would 
presumably be an unattractive way for any of us to acquire our beliefs.  As Strawson notes, “We 
do not wish to be undetermined by anything, so far as the formation of our beliefs (and therefore 
their content) is concerned; nor do we wish to be self-determining with regard to the content of 
 
likely to occur).  I agree, but I am content to work within Strawson’s stricter limits for the time being. 
5 Perhaps it would be best to say that a person’s choices, rather than a person’s actions, are fully explicable by 
reference to her desires and beliefs.  Strawson does not put it this way, but he does recognize that other, non-mental 
factors will bear upon an agent’s actions.  My ordering vanilla over chocolate ice cream, for example, will require, 
among many other things, the physical ability to communicate in some way. 
6 I suppose there may be cases in which an agent would rather have a false belief than a true one, such as married 
persons who would rather live oblivious to their spouses’ extramarital affairs than face the ugly truth of infidelity.  
But even in these cases, I believe the agents desire first and foremost that their beliefs be true—namely, that their 
spouses aren’t cheating on them.  If they learn otherwise, they may want to “block out” the truth and live in self-
willed delusion, but I think this is indicative of a fervent desire that things be different than they are, not that their 
beliefs be rooted in anything other than the truth. 
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our beliefs; nor do we think we are […].  Rather, we think (and hope) that what we believe is 
determined by, and as a result reflects, how things are” (1986: 43).  If it were both possible and 
common for us to self-determine our beliefs, it is doubtful that we would regard beliefs in the 
same reality-reflecting way that we do. 
None of this is to say that we, as agents, do not influence our beliefs in some vital sense.  
Indeed, many of us make choices that directly bear upon the beliefs we come to acquire.  To give 
an example, one’s belief that the notes D, E, F♯, G, A, B, and C♯ make up the scale of D major 
may hinge upon a past decision to study music theory.  But even beliefs whose origins can be 
traced back to some choice or decision on the part of the agent do not make that agent self-
determined in her beliefs.  If everything goes according to plan, all of our beliefs will be rooted 
in reality, whether they tie back to some particular decision we made or not.  Strawson notes, 
“We may […] choose to acquire a lot of beliefs about this or that, but once we are in pursuit of 
such beliefs we do not wish to be able to choose what their content will be, we just want them to 
be true” (ibid.). 
Desires bring other considerations to the table, though they prove no less problematic in 
terms of achieving self-determination.  Strawson admits that we have a certain amount of sway 
over our desires, much more so than in the case of beliefs, but not to the extent that we can 
properly be said to have self-determined our desires.  The notion of so-called “acquired tastes” 
will make Strawson’s point clear.  Consider a teenager who intentionally drinks beer until he 
genuinely comes to like it.  In some sense, the teenager has intentionally changed his desires 
regarding beer, but as Strawson would quickly point out, the teenager will have had reasons for 
seeking to change his beer-disliking disposition in the first place.  So unless the teenager is truly 
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responsible for the reasons that led to his decision to overcome his initial dislike of beer, he will 
not be truly responsible for developing the acquired taste.  According to Strawson: 
If one is to be truly responsible for one’s actions because one has chosen the desires 
(values, etc.) which lead one to act as one does, then one must clearly be truly responsible 
for this choice of desires in turn.  And one can be truly responsible for this choice of 
desires only if one makes it in a reasoned, conscious, intentional fashion.  But one cannot 
do this unless one chooses according to values and preferences one already has in the 
matter of what desires to have.  (1986: 49) 
Put simply, even if there is some legitimate way in which an agent can be said to have chosen her 
desires, the choices that will have determined those desires will themselves have been made in 
light of desires the agent already had.  The agent who seeks self-determination by way of 
choosing her desires comes up against the same difficulties faced by the agent who seeks self-
determination in regard to actions more generally.  Neither can claim true responsibility for her 
motives, for the reasons she has for making the choices she does. 
 
2.3 The Basic Argument 
The preceding considerations give rise to what Strawson terms in (2002) and (2003) the 
Basic Argument.  Strawson articulates the argument in a variety of ways, some with much 
greater detail than others, but the heart of it can be preserved by paraphrasing one of his simpler 
renditions.7  The Basic Argument can be stated as follows: 
Whenever we choose to perform some action A, we do so because of the reasons (made 
up of desires and beliefs, broadly speaking) that we have for choosing A at the time.  Because our 
                                                 
7 Strawson offers no less than four variations of the Basic Argument between 443 and 448 of (2003).  Other versions 
appear at 15-16 and 17 of (1995) and 212-213, 219, and 219-20 of (2002). 
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reasons lead us to choose the way we do, we can only be truly responsible for choosing A if we 
are truly responsible for having those reasons that brought about our choosing A.  However, to be 
truly responsible for our reasons for choosing A, we must have consciously and explicitly chosen 
to have those reasons.  But even if we did consciously and explicitly choose to have the reasons 
that led us to choose to do A, we will have made that choice due to the reasons we had for 
choosing to choose to have the reasons for choosing A.  In order to be truly responsible for those 
reasons—that is, for the reasons that led us to choose to choose to have the reasons for choosing 
A—we would have to have consciously and explicitly chosen to have them.  We would have to 
have consciously and explicitly chosen to have the reasons that led us to choose to have the 
reasons that led us to choose to have the reasons for choosing A.  The story then repeats ad 
infinitum. 
An example may make this clearer.  While something as basic as choosing between 
chocolate and vanilla ice cream would illustrate the point, considering an example of even minor 
moral import will best preserve the tone of Strawson’s argument.  (I will utilize this example at 
various times throughout the thesis.)  Consider a woman, Nina, who lives in an apartment 
complex.  One day she arrives home very late at night and notices that the car she recognizes as 
her neighbor’s still has its headlights on.  As she walks past the car on the way to her apartment, 
she sees that nobody is in the car.  As would most of us, Nina assumes the headlights have been 
left on unintentionally.  Immediately, Nina thinks of notifying her neighbor, but it’s late enough 
that Nina, who is already quite shy, feels very uneasy about knocking on the door of someone 
she considers a virtual stranger.  However, Nina then notices that the passenger-side door (and 
only the passenger-side door) is unlocked, and it occurs to Nina that she could very well just 
open the door, reach in, and turn off the headlights herself.  This results in a dilemma.  On the 
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one hand, Nina feels uncomfortable knocking on her neighbor’s door when, for all she knows, 
the neighbor will be more upset about having been awoken than about his headlights still being 
on.  On the other hand, entering her neighbor’s vehicle without his knowledge, even to do him a 
favor, also makes Nina anxious.  (After all, what if the neighbor happens to come out as she is 
climbing into his car?  The very thought nearly paralyzes poor Nina!)  Of course, Nina could just 
ignore the situation, figuring a dead car battery is fair recompense for the neighbor’s oversight.  
But as tempting as this is, Nina feels that doing nothing would be immoral.  And so, after a 
moment’s deliberation, Nina quickly heads to the passenger-side door, opens it, leans across the 
seat, and switches off the headlights before hurrying into her apartment and heading to bed. 
Many of us would agree that Nina has acted commendably in turning off the headlights 
of her neighbor’s car.  However, Strawson would point out that in order for Nina to be truly 
responsible for her actions and thus truly deserving of praise, Nina would need somehow to be 
truly responsible for whatever reasons led her to switch off the headlights.  The obvious reasons 
at play, however, do not seem to allow for this.  Nina’s beliefs that the car headlights were on, 
that she could turn them off, and that doing so would be the polite thing to do are not beliefs for 
which Nina can be said to be truly responsible.  There is no sense in which Nina was self-
determined in having those particular beliefs, as they appear to be a byproduct of her situation.  
Likewise, Nina’s desire to act courteously is not a product of self-determination.  Perhaps Nina 
made a conscious choice many years ago always to be a courteous person and to do for others 
any favors that could be done without greatly inconveniencing herself.  But even if Nina has 
acted on the precepts of this conscious choice made in the past (call it C1), Strawson would 
argue that Nina is not truly responsible for her actions.  Acting in accordance with C1 is not 
enough to give Nina true responsibility for her actions because Nina will have chosen C1 based 
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on some other set of reasons for which she is not truly responsible.  She may have chosen C1, for 
example, simply because she believed that adhering to C1 would make her a praiseworthy person 
and because she desired to be considered a praiseworthy person.  But to be truly responsible for 
either of those reasons for choosing C1, she would have to have consciously chosen to possess 
that particular reason and she would have to be truly self-determined in her deciding to possess 
it.  The story then repeats with a new cast of beliefs and desires, and eventually we will come to 
some initial beliefs and desires that (incontestably, it seems) are entirely outside of Nina’s 
control, beliefs and desires that stem from Nina’s very early upbringing, from her particular 
genetic makeup, and so on. 
It will be useful here to include a simplified version of the Basic Argument.  The 
premises can be given as follows: 
(1) One’s actions (at least those for which one might be considered responsible) are 
determined by one’s reasons. 
(2) Thus, to be truly responsible for one’s actions, one must be self-determined in 
one’s reasons for performing that action. 
(3) To be self-determined in one’s reasons, one must have consciously and explicitly 
chosen to have (at least some of) those reasons and be self-determined in having 
made the choice to have those reasons. 
(4) To be self-determined in having made the choice referenced in (3), one must have 
been self-determined in one’s reasons for making that choice.8 
                                                 
8 One may compare this standardization of Strawson’s argument with his own standardization at (1986: 27-28).  
Though my version is less than half the length of Strawson’s, I do not feel it leaves out anything significant.  
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Premise (4) leads right back to premise (3), supposedly beginning an infinite loop.  The only way 
to break the regress is to concede (eventually) that one has acted on the basis of reasons that were 
not self-determined. 
The Basic Argument relies on two very important moves.  The first is the move from 
premise (1) to premise (2).  Strawson could be more explicit about why premise (1) leads to 
premise (2), but it is clear enough that he sees premise (2) as a consequence of premise (1).9  
One may wish to question this move, however, or at least to come to a clearer understanding of 
how the word “determined” in premise (1) is being used.  It may be that a gap exists between (1) 
and (2) if certain deterministic presumptions are not met.  For instance, it may not be clear that 
one needs to be self-determined in one’s reasons in order to be truly responsible for one’s action
if one’s reasons do not cause one’s actions.  As I will argue in chapter 3, that one’s reasons caus
one’s actions is an unwarranted assumption which Strawson’s argument requires to proceed.  If 
doubt can be cast over the causal efficacy of reasons, we may be justified in rejecting the Basic 
Argument altogether, since it will no longer be clear precisely why one must self-determine 
one’s reasons in order to be truly morally responsible for one’s actions. 
s 
e 
The more significant feature of Strawson’s argument, of course, is the threat of infinite 
regress that comes out in (3) and (4).  Even if reasons are non-causal, the kind of actions with 
which we are presently concerned will all be done for reasons, and Strawson will likely contend 
that to be truly responsible, one must avoid the circular trap of (3) and (4) even if the link 
between premises (1) and (2) has not adequately been established.  Though I remain 
unconvinced that the (potential) infinite regress of one’s reasons threatens true moral 
responsibility in any obvious way, I will respond to this challenge in chapter 4 by arguing that 
many choices the typical agent makes will be based on reasons that are not subject to the 
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problem of regress.  More specifically, the fact that an agent willingly forfeits certain courses of 
action will often be explained, at least in part, by the agent’s decision to do something else 
instead at that time, a reason that arises simultaneously with (though is not identical to) the 
agent’s decision to forfeit certain courses of action and thus prevents a regress from ever taking 
place. 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 Compare my “thus” in premise (2) with Strawson’s “therefore” in premise (3) of (1986: 28). 
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3 The Role of Reasons in Rational Action 
As we have seen, Strawson denies that an agent can be self-determined in her actions.  He 
roots this impossibility in the idea that an agent acts based on reasons for which she cannot be 
truly responsible, either because she will not have consciously and explicitly chosen to have 
them or because she will have consciously and explicitly chosen to have them based ultimately 
on reasons that she did not consciously and explicitly choose to have.  Because an agent is not 
responsible for those very things (i.e. beliefs and desires) that determine what she does, Strawson 
says, the agent cannot be self-determined in her actions.  The purpose of this chapter is to show 
that Strawson’s argument is persuasive only if one believes that one’s reasons cause one’s 
actions.  In the first part of this chapter, I will show how Strawson’s argument relies on a causal 
link between one’s reasons and one’s actions, despite Strawson’s attempts to appease those who 
would disagree with him.  In the second part of this chapter, I will draw upon Carl Ginet’s work 
to argue that reasons need not be regarded as causal, and as such, that the intuitive force of 
Strawson’s argument is lost.  The threat of infinite regress that is the heart of Strawson’s 
argument will then be discussed in chapter 4. 
 
3.1 Reasons as Causal Explanations – Strawson’s Approach 
The interplay between an agent’s reasons for performing some action A and the agent’s 
actual performing of A is of paramount importance to the Basic Argument.  Strawson claims that 
an agent cannot be responsible for her actions if she is not responsible for her reasons, precisely 
because those reasons bring about those actions.  This was evidenced in the move from premise 
(1) to premise (2) of the simplified version of the Basic Argument given in 2.3.  Strawson’s way 
of thinking raises the important question of how one’s reasons produce one’s actions, since the 
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determination of one’s actions by one’s reasons forms the foundational premise of Strawson’s 
entire argument. 
Strawson believes an agent’s reasons are causal.  When speaking of actions, the 
dichotomy he offers is that actions are either “caused (determined) or ‘random’ (undetermined)” 
(1986: 8).  Thus, when Strawson claims that one’s reasons determine one’s actions, he 
presumably means to say that one’s reasons cause one’s actions.  This causal assumption 
permeates Strawson’s work.  Rather frequently, Strawson goes beyond the notion that an agent 
will act in light of her reasons (whichever course of action she happens to choose) and makes the 
much stronger claim that the specific action the agent undertakes will be the result of factors 
ultimately beyond the agent’s control.  “The particular way in which one is moved […],” says 
Strawson, “and the degree of one’s success […] will be determined by how one already is” 
(1986: 30, emphasis mine).  Elsewhere, he says that, after one deliberates, “which reasons finally 
weigh with one is wholly a matter of one’s mental nature […] which is something for which one 
cannot be in any way [truly responsible]” (2002: 455, emphasis mine; similar talk can be found 
in (2003) at 214 and, more extensively, at 223-4).  These sentiments are at the heart of the Basic 
Argument.  Reasons bring about an agent’s actions, but the agent cannot possibly be truly 
responsible for those reasons.  Hence, the agent cannot be truly responsible for her actions. 
If one’s reasons cause one’s actions, and if one cannot be responsible for one’s reasons, 
then one cannot be responsible for one’s actions.  Such an argument holds intuitive sway, even if 
it is contestable.  But it is not so clear that Strawson’s argument works if reasons are not 
presumed to be causal in the first place.  Attempting to appease those who would reject the idea 
that reasons are causal, Strawson offers an alternative definition of “to determine” that does not 
employ such causal language.  He says that “to determine [e.g. one’s actions]” may be rendered 
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“to play a crucial role in whatever process it is that finally determines the nature of [e.g. one’s 
actions]” (1986: 34-35),10 and later he states that one’s reasons can be said to fully determine 
(rationally speaking) one’s actions, though this means only that one’s reasons provide “a true and 
full rational explanation of” one’s actions (1986: 37).  Strawson has thus articulated a theory in 
which one’s reasons can be said to determine one’s actions so long as those reasons either 
explain or significantly factor into one’s actions. 
These non-causal definitions are obviously meant to preserve the cogency of Strawson’s 
argument for the widest audience possible, but in reality they threaten the intuitive force of his 
argument.  Consider the case of Nina introduced in 2.3 in light of the first non-causal definition 
just offered.  Nina’s reasons may indeed “play a crucial role”11 in her decision to turn off her 
neighbor’s headlights, but does this make it obvious that Nina needs to be self-determined in 
those reasons in order to act in a truly responsible way?  Not at all; if premise (1) of the Basic 
Argument is rendered as “one’s reasons play a crucial role in determining one’s actions,” then 
the move to premise (2), “thus, to be truly responsible for one’s actions, one must be self-
determined in one’s reasons for performing that action,” seems a bit forced.  If (2) is supposed to 
follow from (1) alone, the motivation for that move should be obvious.  But it just is not clear 
what motivates that move on this non-causal rendition of the Basic Argument, nor is it intuitive 
(to me at least) that one’s reasons “playing a crucial role” in one’s actions precludes oneself from 
being the determiner of those actions in some significant sense.  If an agent can still be a 
significant determiner of her actions, even with premise (1) being true, then is it not clear that 
true moral responsibility should also require the agent to be self-determined in her reasons.  In 
                                                 
10 Strawson offers this non-causal definition “for the sake of those who are unhappy about the fact that reasons can 
truly be said to cause actions” (1986: 37).  The condescending tone is duly noted. 
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fact, given the vagueness of Strawson’s non-causal definition of “determine,” one could easily 
assert that Nina does self-determine her actions.  If it is at all appropriate to say that Nina, 
whatever else Nina is, is the possessor of those reasons and/or the doer of those actions that 
spring from those reasons, then it seems Nina undoubtedly plays a crucial role in those actions 
coming about—the actions would not have taken place without her!  So long as “determine” just 
means “play a crucial role,” it is not clear why Nina needs to determine her reasons in order to 
determine her actions. 
Another way to look at it: Strawson allows for a definition of “determine” that does not 
require a causal connection between X and Y in order for it to be the case that X determines Y.  In 
turn, Strawson cannot (consistently, at least) claim that Nina needs to cause her actions or her 
reasons in order to be self-determining in those actions or reasons.  Surely Nina’s very existence 
“plays a crucial role” in her actions and her reasons coming about, so if “determine” just means 
“plays a crucial role,” I do not see how Nina could fail to be self-determining.  If Strawson feels 
that Nina’s “playing a crucial role” in her actions is not enough for her to be self-determining, 
then I am baffled that he should regard Nina’s reasons “playing a crucial role” in her actions as 
sufficient for those reasons determining those actions, especially to the extent that Nina can no 
longer take any genuine moral responsibility for what she does. 
Strawson’s non-causal definition of “fully determine” wreaks equal havoc on the Basic 
Argument.  As noted, Strawson states that an agent’s reasons fully determine her actions 
(rationally speaking) so long as those reasons provide a true and full rational explanation of those 
actions.  In other words, an agent’s reasons fully determine her actions if, once those reasons are 
cited, no further explanation for the action is necessary, at least from a rational perspective.  If it 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 I have admittedly trimmed down Strawson’s non-causal definition of “determine,” but I do not believe this affects 
anything other than making it easier to read.  If one wishes, one may substitute Strawson’s full non-causal definition 
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is accurate to say that Nina turned off her neighbor’s car headlights because she (a) believed they 
were on, (b) believed she could turn them off, (c) believed it would be the polite thing to do, and 
(d) desired to be polite, then assuming there is no other reason (e) that Nina had for turning off 
the headlights, the reason set comprised of (a)-(d) can be said to have fully determined that Nina 
turned off her neighbor’s headlights.  But again, it is unclear how the fact that (a)-(d) provides a 
full rational account of Nina’s action would ipso facto prohibit her from being truly responsible 
for performing the action unless she is also responsible for having (a)-(d) in the first place.  
Suppose someone believes (erroneously, on Strawson’s account) that Nina is truly responsible 
for her actions even though she did not choose to have the desires and beliefs that make up (a)-
(d).  Now imagine Strawson were to spring from the shadows and confront this person, saying, 
“Think again, my friend!  For Nina’s beliefs and desires (a)-(d) provide a full rational 
explanation of Nina’s actions!”  Strawson’s surprise entrance aside, I would expect the 
confronted person only to be baffled.  I would not expect this person, in virtue of this new 
information from Strawson, to suddenly doubt Nina’s responsibility.  Yet this is the precise kind 
of thinking on which the first move of the Basic Argument relies—that because one’s reasons 
provide a full rational explanation of one’s rational actions, one can only be responsible for those 
actions if one is self-determined in one’s reasons for performing those actions.  Thus, altering 
premise (1) of the Basic Argument to read “one’s actions are truly and fully rationally explained 
by one’s reasons” also makes the jump from (1) to (2) questionable. 
At this point, Strawson and his supporters are likely to jump to the problem of self-
determination.  Nina did not self-determine her reasons, nor could she have, for to self-determine 
one’s reasons requires an infinite regress of self-determined choices to have the reasons one has 
for choosing to have the reasons one has, and this is why she cannot be truly responsible for her 
                                                                                                                                                             
of “determine” for any instance where I have abbreviated it. 
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actions.  Such is the primary concern of the Basic Argument as flushed out in chapter 2.  Yet the 
immediate point being discussed is that it is unclear why Strawson would make the self-
determination of reasons a necessary condition for true moral responsibility if the causal link 
between one’s reasons and one’s actions is not assumed.  The connection between premises (1) 
and (2) of the Basic Argument cannot be explained by appealing to the circularity inherent in 
premises (3) and (4), so to bypass (1) and go directly into problems of infinite regress is just to 
assume the truth of (2), which is arguably a contentious premise.  Clearly Strawson does not 
view premise (1) as superfluous to his argument, but the support it offers (2) appears incredibly 
weak for those who do not share Strawson’s belief that reasons are causal.  Unfortunately for 
Strawson, he does not invest more time into defending this move, regarding it (mistakenly) as an 
unquestionably intuitive move to make.12 
It could be that Strawson is leaving the most crucial premise of his argument unstated.  
Perhaps the first premise of the Basic Argument should be something like the following: “If one 
is to be truly morally responsible for one’s actions, one’s reasons must cause those actions.”  
This premise would prohibit any non-causal account of reasons from providing a satisfactory 
response to the Basic Argument.  But nothing about the Basic Argument suggests that this 
premise should be presumed.  Strawson does not introduce the premise, of course, but neither is 
it evident that he takes the premise for granted.  In fact, if Strawson does take this premise for 
granted, it is odd that he should introduce non-causal definitions of “determine” so as to make 
the Basic Argument tenable for those who reject causal accounts of reasons.  Such a step would 
                                                 
12 That Strawson finds the move from (1) to (2) intellectually obvious is evidenced by quotations such as the 
following: “If one is to be truly responsible for one’s actions, then, clearly, one must be truly self-determining or 
truly self-determined in one’s actions,” and, “Such self-determination may seem evidently impossible.  But it can 
also seem to be clearly necessary if one is indeed to be truly responsible for one’s actions” (1986: 26-27, emphases 
mine).  These quotes come early in Strawson’s explication of his argument and, sadly, he fails ever to explain what 
makes these connections so “clear.” 
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seem unnecessary if the suggested premise were meant to be part of Strawson’s argument, since 
the premise would already rule out true moral responsibility on any non-causal account of 
reasons that could be offered.  Thus, I reject the idea that Strawson, who has exerted much effort 
to ensure that his argument is amenable to all, intends either of himself or of his audience for this 
premise to be presumed. 
Evidentially, Strawson goes beyond the mere favoring of a causal definition of 
“determine” and relies on it to make his argument persuasive.  Ultimately, it appears to be the 
causal role of reasons that is meant to prohibit the self-determination of actions.  Our actions are 
caused by our reasons, so we cannot be self-determined in our actions unless we can somehow 
self-determine our reasons (which we cannot since this would require a self-determined action 
in-and-of itself), at least according to Strawson.  In the following section of chapter 3, I will take 
issue with the causal assumptions underlying the Basic Argument.  I will argue that sufficient 
evidence exists for resisting the claim that reasons are causal.  Because a non-causal account of 
reasons will not hinder one’s reasons from properly explaining one’s actions, there will be no 
need to posit a causal link between one’s reasons and one’s actions.  The Basic Argument will 
thus have been shown to rest on a faulty assumption. 
 
3.2 Reasons as Non-Causal Explanations – Ginet’s Approach 
It is clear that Strawson’s argument relies upon the idea that reasons are causal.  This 
reliance is not only implicit in several key passages arguing for the impossibility of true moral 
responsibility, but it has been shown that the force of Strawson’s argument wanes without such a 
causal assumption in place.  Not every philosopher takes it for granted that reasons are causal, 
however.  In defense of indeterminism, Carl Ginet (1995) argues for an account of reasons 
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explanations that dismisses the notion of reasons as causally efficacious.  Ginet’s primary motive 
is to defend indeterminism against the claim that any coherent reasons explanation must 
presuppose the causality of reasons.  While I do not wish to argue against determinism in 
general, Ginet’s theory will serve to discredit what Strawson refers to as “reasons/actions 
determination” (1986: 44-45).  With a tenable non-causal account of reasons explanations in 
place, the impetus of Strawson’s argument will founder. 
Ginet purports to give what he calls “an anomic [i.e. lawless] sufficient condition for a 
reasons explanation” (81).  For Ginet, reasons explanations are meant to capture the motivation 
behind one’s actions, the end or ends that an agent intentionally aims to satisfy by performing 
some particular action.  That is it.  Causal claims are unnecessary.  According to Ginet, “The 
only thing required for the truth of a reasons explanation of this [anomic] sort, besides the 
occurrence of the explained action, is that the action have been accompanied by an intention with 
the right sort of content” (ibid.).  The accuracy of a reasons explanation does not hinge on the 
existence of causal laws, then, but rather on the intentional stance of the agent at the time she 
acts.13  In other words, if we say that Nina turned off her neighbor’s car headlights because she 
thought it would be nice to turn off the headlights, she believed it was within her means to do so, 
and she wanted to be nice, then we have fairly and accurately given a reasons explanation for 
Nina’s actions so long as these descriptions match Nina’s thoughts as she turns off the 
headlights.  According to Ginet, we need not—and indeed should not—go one step further and 
claim that those reasons caused Nina to turn off the headlights.  Because Nina’s actions are 
justifiably explained by her reasons without bringing in some kind of causal law requiring that 
                                                 
13 Indeed, it is highly unlikely that most people accept reasons explanations only on the assumption that such causal 
laws exist.  Ginet makes a similar point when he says that an agent need not believe in any such causal law in order 
to hold the belief that, if a certain condition holds (e.g. the agent’s friend does not call by noon), the agent will 
definitely perform a certain action (e.g. the agent will call the friend) (2002: 400). 
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she choose the way she does, there is no reason to postulate such a causal law other than to 
satisfy a pre-existing bias that such a law must exist. 
Still, some will insist that a causal link is implicit in the fact that Nina clearly decides to 
do what she prefers to do.  Nina’s reasons for turning off the headlights are her strongest reasons 
in the situation, as evidenced by the fact that Nina chooses to satisfy those reasons and not any 
others.  If they are her strongest reasons, then they will undoubtedly win out and cause Nina to 
choose as she does.  This fact may be obscured when we ask only about the action Nina does 
perform and the reasons behind it, but the causal link between reasons and actions becomes 
obvious once we ask why Nina chooses one course of action over another.  That is, we must ask 
not “Why does Nina turn off the headlights?” but “Why does Nina turn off the headlights rather 
than notify her neighbor or ignore the situation?” if we are to bring these causal implications to 
light.  If Nina gives all of these actions consideration and yet chooses to turn off the headlights, 
then it is clear that Nina’s reasons for turning off the headlights outweigh any reasons to do 
otherwise.  The weight of Nina’s various reasons is what causes Nina’s actions.  And so the 
objection goes. 
There is a problem with this objection that becomes apparent when we ask how it is 
assessed that one set of reasons is “stronger” than another.  In hindsight, of course, the 
assessment is quite easy.  If we know that an agent wasn’t coerced, that she didn’t consider 
herself to be acting against her will, then we can safely conclude that whatever reasons she acted 
upon were her strongest.  But is this helpful?  It seems a rather ad hoc theory for determining 
which of an agent’s beliefs and desires are stronger than others.  Indeed, there is an inherent 
circularity to such thinking: Nina turned off the headlights herself because her reasons in favor of 
doing so were stronger than her reasons for not doing so, and we know they were stronger 
26 
because they are reasons on which Nina chose to act.  Such an explanation already assumes that 
one set of reasons had to be determinately stronger, and that those stronger reasons, in virtue of 
being the strongest, would cause the agent to act as she did.  As Ginet puts it, we can safely 
assume that “the strongest motive [i.e. set of reasons] prevails … only by making it true by 
definition: ‘the strongest motive’ means the motive that prevails” (77).  Tautologous definitions 
of this sort, however, fail to establish a causal connection between reasons and actions. 
There may be something else that the objector means when speaking of some reasons 
being stronger than others, something that really does demonstrate a causal link between one’s 
reasons and one’s actions.  I leave it to the objector to provide that definition.  Experience hardly 
suggests that one type of reason (e.g. pragmatic concerns) always trumps another (e.g. physical 
gratification).  Granted, people report being overcome by their desires to such a degree that, by 
their own admissions, they could not have done otherwise.  But this hardly speaks to all 
situations, especially to the kind of everyday circumstances with which we are currently 
concerned.  The notion of willpower exists because agents sometimes do what they do not feel 
they want to do most—for example, the dieting man who passes up his favorite dessert.  
Likewise, weakness of the will can be said to occur when an agent does what she feels is not in 
her best interest—the student who goes to a party the night before her final exams rather than 
studying, for instance.  Keeping these things in mind, the definition of “strongest reasons” 
becomes elusive if we prohibit references to what an agent already did or will in fact do.  What 
other properties does a “strongest reason” possess, other than being a reason on which an agent 
will or did act?  The silence is telling. 
The causal efficacy of reasons is already looking quite suspect, but there is another 
reason to be skeptical.  Looking again at Nina, there is no obvious way in which Nina’s beliefs or 
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desires change between the time she begins deliberating about how to handle the headlight 
situation and the time she decides to turn off the headlights herself.  If one’s reasons cause one’s 
actions (or, more modestly, one’s decisions to act), then it seems an agent who has the beliefs 
and desires necessary for bringing about a certain action would be moved into action as soon as 
those reasons come to mind.  Put another way, if Nina’s beliefs and desires (a)-(d) cause her 
decision to turn off the headlights, then why does she not make that decision immediately upon 
realizing (a)-(d)?  It seems something must explain the delay between Nina’s having the 
sufficient reasons for acting and her actually acting on those reasons, but this is just to cast doubt 
on those reasons being causal. 
Ginet picks up on this very point (2002: 394-5).  Using the example of a person deciding 
to turn on his turn signal to indicate an upcoming turn, Ginet points out that an agent might not 
act at the very moment the relevant reasons for doing so are in place.  Though the driver notices 
that his turn is coming up, he may not signal immediately, and yet this does not entail that the 
driver will have different reasons for signaling at the time he turns on the signal than he would 
have had had he signaled earlier.  As Ginet explains,  
[The driver] might have been aware that his turn was coming up, and have been intending 
to signal before getting there, for some time before he actually signaled; and he might 
have signaled at any of many different moments between that moment and the moment 
his turn came up, and the reasons explanation of his raising his arm have been the same, 
namely, that the wanted thereby to let others know that he would be turning at the next 
intersection and believed that raising his arm would do that. (395) 
Ginet’s case differs from mine in that the driver is not deliberating about anything—he already 
knows that he is going to signal, it is just a matter of when.  Even so, the take-away message is 
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the same: the fact that an agent need not act on her reasons the moment she has them is a strong 
indicator that one’s reasons do not cause one’s actions.  Moreover, the fact that an agent’s 
reasons are not causal does not invalidate the reasons explanation that cites those reasons.  In the 
driver case, just as with Nina, the reasons explanation given does not derive its intelligibility 
from the assumption of causal laws. 
Of course, it must be recognized that nothing in this chapter has proven that reasons are 
not causal.  But it does appear that we have good reasons for suspending the belief that reasons 
are causal, and as such, we should refrain from endorsing any theory that is coherent only if we 
take the causal efficacy of reasons for granted.  I argued in 3.1 that the Basic Argument derives 
plausibility from doing just that—presuming that one’s reasons cause one’s actions.  Though 
Strawson attempts to give a non-causal account of the Basic Argument, it was shown that the 
non-causal definitions of “determine” he offers fail to get his argument off the ground.  It has 
now also been shown that there is strong evidence suggesting that reasons are not causal.  As 
such, Strawson’s theory has been significantly weakened, relying on a move from premise (1) to 
(2) that makes intuitive sense only if reasons are causally efficacious, which should not be 
presumed. 
In an effort to preserve Strawson’s argument, many will be prepared to accept premise 
(2), that an agent is truly responsible for her actions only if she is self-determined in her reasons 
for performing that action, without any supporting argumentation whatsoever.  If this is taken for 
granted, then the rest of the Basic Argument still holds and the problem of infinite regress 
reemerges.  I personally remain unconvinced of (2), but I am also fortunate enough to believe 
that infinite regress is not the threat Strawson suggests.  In chapter 4, I will explain why, arguing 
that in many cases, an agent’s actions are explainable by reasons that were chosen by the agent 
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but that cannot be traced back in their entirety to still earlier, non-chosen reasons.  The result is 
that an infinite regress never takes place. 
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4 The Freedom of Forfeiture 
In chapter 1, I asserted that Strawson’s position could be countered by focusing on an 
agent’s decision not to take some particular course of action.  I call such decisions action-
forfeitures, and I am now prepared to give an account of how action-forfeitures can avoid the 
threat of infinite regress posed by the Basic Argument.  However, before I begin, I would like to 
forestall a handful of possible objections to my theory by more closely examining the nature of 
action-forfeitures.  There are two main points about action-forfeitures that I would like to make: 
(1) action-forfeitures are actions in and of themselves, and thus just as susceptible to moral 
scrutiny as any other action, and (2) at least some action-forfeitures are unique choices that an 
agent makes, not identical to any other choice the agent makes.14 
The first two sections of this chapter will be devoted, respectively, to the two features of 
action-forfeitures that I have just mentioned.  The third section of this chapter will show how 
action-forfeitures allow us to avoid the problem of infinite regress.  The final section of this 
chapter will then re-examine the notion of self-determination presented by Strawson and argue 
that, with causal assumptions and worries about infinite regress effectively put to the side, self-
determination appears to be a viable possibility. 
 
4.1 Action-Forfeitures as Actions 
In the previous chapter, there was some discussion of why an agent would choose to do 
one thing rather than another.  The very nature of choice15 demands that there be, or at least 
seem to be, two or more possible courses of action available to an agent.  Hence, every time an 
                                                 
14 It may not prove significant whether we or not we regard action-forfeitures as actions per se, so long as we 
recognize that action-forfeitures are eligible for moral evaluation.  However, I follow Strawson when he says that he 
will “take it to be obvious that choices and decisions can be actions” (1986: 134n2). 
15 For this thesis, I will assume that choices must be consciously made in order to count as choices.  
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agent makes a choice, she will consciously be choosing one thing rather than another.  This is 
true even in situations where the only two options under consideration are (1) performing a 
certain action A, and (2) abstaining from performing A.  To give a rudimentary example, suppose 
you are driving somewhere in your car and your gas light comes on, indicating that you soon 
need to refuel.  If your destination is not far off, you may consider postponing the filling up of 
your car’s gas tank until after you have completed your business at said destination.  In such a 
situation, you may regard yourself as deliberating over just one thing—namely, stopping for 
gas—but it is clear that two genuine courses of action appear available to you.  You can either 
stop for gas, or you can continue on to your destination uninterrupted.  Because either option 
entails that the other does not occur, making a choice will require not only a commitment to one 
course of action, but a “surrendering” of the other.  That is, you must “give up” or “forfeit” one 
possible course of action in order to accomplish the other.  If you decide to stop and refuel, you 
forfeit the option of continuing to your destination uninterrupted, and vice versa. 
Whenever an agent consciously and willingly forfeits a certain course of action she 
believes it is possible for her to take, this may be considered an action-forfeiture.  In contrast, I 
will refer to those courses of action that an agent consciously and willingly decides to take (i.e. 
the opposite of an action-forfeiture) as action-commitments.  This is to prevent the ambiguity of 
the more neutral term choice.  As I see it, we often refer to the deliberating agent who comes to a 
decision as making a single choice, when in actuality the agent typically commits to one or more 
courses of action while forfeiting other courses of action at precisely one and the same 
moment—that is, the agent often makes action-commitments and action-forfeitures 
simultaneously.  I will explain my reasons for regarding concurrent action-commitments and 
action-forfeitures as distinct choices in 4.2.  For now, it is enough to acknowledge that action-
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forfeitures do occur, that an agent does consciously forfeit one or more courses of action 
whenever she decides between two or more options. 
One question that may be asked is whether action-forfeitures should count as actions at 
all.  Lest someone think that action-forfeitures are special cases that Strawson would reject, let 
me point out that Strawson himself speaks of agents deciding not to do things as if they were any 
other decisions an agent could make.  A case in point is when Strawson discusses an agent’s 
decision not to eat (1986: 45-46).  Trying to combat the notion that an agent must act freely 
when he chooses to eat because, after all, the agent could have chosen not to eat, Strawson 
contends that a decision not to eat will face the same exact difficulties in satisfying the 
requirements for self-determination that choosing to eat would face: 
If [the agent] had chosen not to eat, it would have been because he had reason not to 
despite his hunger and desire to eat.  But then we may ask where and how self-
determination and true responsibility are supposed to enter the picture, unless [the agent] 
is somehow responsible for his reasons.  It seems clear that what [the agent] does when 
he acts intentionally is, ultimately, always and necessarily just some more or less 
complex function of his reasons; and that he cannot therefore be truly self-determining 
unless he can somehow be self-determining with respect to his reasons […]. (ibid.) 
Notice that Strawson says the agent “acts intentionally,” though the matter at hand is an agent’s 
deciding not to eat.  Clearly, then, Strawson puts what I have called action-forfeitures and action-
commitments on equal ground, in part because action-forfeitures are genuine choices that an 
agent can make, and in part because action-forfeitures are explainable by reference to an agent’s 
reasons, just like action-commitments. 
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Classifying action-forfeitures as actions makes even more sense when we realize that 
action-forfeitures are just as eligible for moral praise and blame as are action-commitments.  
Consider the man who idly stands by as a child drowns.  If it is within reason to suppose that this 
man could have done something to help the child, the man’s passivity is bound to be censured.16  
Likewise, consider the smoker who desperately wants to quit and, in a very concentrated effort to 
break his habit, refrains from smoking.  Undoubtedly, some would find it morally commendable 
that the smoker withstands his nicotine cravings, even though this praise would stem from the 
smoker doing “nothing.”  In both the reluctant smoker and the drowning child cases, the praise or 
blame we ascribe is likely to be heightened by, if not entirely dependent upon, the fact that the 
agent in question makes a conscious decision not to do something, in one case to smoke a 
cigarette, in the other case to help an endangered child. 
Because action-forfeitures have the feature of being conscious, morally-evaluative 
choices that an agent makes on the basis of reasons, and because Strawson himself accepts 
action-forfeitures as actions, I will consider it uncontroversial to regard action-forfeitures as 
actions while responding to the Basic Argument. 
 
4.2 Action-Forfeitures as Distinct Choices 
So far I have been speaking of action-forfeitures as distinct choices that an agent makes, 
almost as if they are independent of the agent’s decision to pursue some other course of action 
instead of the action being forfeited.  As a matter of fact, I do believe that many action-
                                                 
16 In some cases, the difference between an action-forfeiture and an action-commitment is admittedly slight.  We 
could say that the man makes an action-commitment to stand still, but I believe it depends largely on the man’s own 
thought process.  If, in the man’s own mind, he is focusing on standing there rather than on the fact that he is not 
going to help the child, then he may very well be making an action-commitment.  Given the situation, I find it hard 
to believe the man’s attention would be on his standing in place so much as on the child.  The point is, if the man 
willingly and consciously does not help the child though he believes he could do so, then he is forfeiting that action.  
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forfeitures can be regarded as distinct choices,17 distinguishable from action-commitments 
though the two often occur at the very same instant.  Some may not be prepared to accept this 
claim, however, and so I will here attempt to explicate my position. 
As I see it, an action-forfeiture F can be considered a distinct choice—that is, distinct 
from some choice C—if the following three conditions are met: (1) F results from an intentional 
decision that the agent makes, (2) the agent makes that decision with the belief that F will result 
from that decision, and (3) it is possible for the agent to renege on F (i.e. reconsider and possibly 
even commit to the action that was forfeited) without affecting the agent’s commitment to C.  
Conditions (1) and (2) do little other than state that the action-forfeiture is indeed a matter of 
choice, not just an unforeseen consequence of the agent’s decision.  What (1) and (2) do not 
show is that the action-forfeiture in question is a distinct choice from C, where C may very well 
be an action-commitment concurrent with F.  It is condition (3) that captures this distinction, 
showing that the action-forfeiture F remains (psychologically, at least) independent of the action-
commitment C. 
Let us test out my theory by way of example.  Consider Ronny, a businessman who is 
about to take a lunch break.  On his way out of the office, he deliberates about what to get for 
lunch.  He thinks of the sandwich shop around the corner, a favorite of his, and considers it.  He 
then remembers that a new Chinese eatery about which he has heard very good things has 
opened up adjacent to the sandwich shop.  After a moment’s deliberation, Ronny decides to have 
Chinese and gives up the idea of eating a sandwich.  The result is that Ronny now has an action-
                                                                                                                                                             
It may very well be that he is also making an action-commitment to stand in place, but it will depend on his 
psychological state at the time. 
17 I will stick to the term “distinct,” primarily because action-forfeitures do so often appear at the same time as 
action-commitments and because, as I will argue in 4.3, those concurrent action-commitments may play an 
important explanatory role in the action-forfeitures themselves.  If not for these considerations, I would be 
comfortable referring to action-forfeitures as “independent” choices. 
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commitment to eat Chinese food and has made an action-forfeiture of eating a sandwich.  I 
contend that these constitute two distinct choices. 
It is clear that both Ronny’s action-commitment and Ronny’s action-forfeiture satisfy 
conditions (1) and (2) above.  Both the action-commitment and the action-forfeiture were the 
result of a decision that Ronny intentionally made, and Ronny was well aware of these 
consequences as he made his decision.  However, condition (3) is also met by each choice 
individually.  If the action-commitment and the action-forfeiture were really the same exact 
choice, then it seems they would have to stand or fall together.  That is, it would be impossible 
for Ronny to, say, maintain his sandwich-eating action-forfeiture and yet reconsider his action-
commitment to eating Chinese, for that would mean that Ronny both retains and does not retain 
his choice at the exact same instant. 
As it turns out, the status of Ronny’s action-commitment and of his action-forfeiture can 
change independently of one another.  It could be that after Ronny commits to the idea of getting 
Chinese but just before he places his order, he decides he may very well get a sandwich too.  
Likewise, Ronny could get a sudden craving for pizza before he orders Chinese, and he might 
then deliberate between Chinese food and pizza while never reconsidering sandwiches.  In either 
instance, it seems correct to say that one of Ronny’s choices remains intact, even though the 
other is reevaluated.  Ronny does not have to forfeit sandwiches all over again if he gives up his 
commitment to Chinese, and he does not have to reconsider Chinese food even if he changes his 
mind about not getting a sandwich.  These facts hold true because action-forfeitures and action-
commitments, despite so often appearing together, can remain distinct choices.18 
                                                 
18 If it is helpful, those who remain unconvinced may regard action-forfeitures and action-commitments as distinct 
endorsements, as it were.  That is, Ronny endorses or sanctions both the idea of not getting a sandwich and the idea 
of eating Chinese food.  This does not strike me as a problematic way of viewing the situation, for it seems clear 
enough that Ronny can regard these as two distinct consequences, even if they are, under the circumstances, 
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4.3 Action-Forfeitures and the Evasion of Infinite Regress 
This chapter has thus far demonstrated that action-forfeitures can be morally-evaluative 
actions that are not identical to any action-commitments with which they may simultaneously 
appear.  All that remains to bring my argument to fruition is to show that action-forfeitures can 
provide a tenable account of an action that is not susceptible to infinite regress.  This section of 
chapter 4 will be comprised of just such an account. 
As noted in 4.1, Strawson believes an agent can act based on reasons even when she 
decides not to do something.  This is important because, going back to chapter 2, Strawson says 
that rational actions—actions for which an accurate reasons explanation can be given—provide 
the locus for questions about free will and moral responsibility.  By Strawson’s own admission, 
then, action-forfeitures are rational actions, and accordingly, they are eligible for considerations 
of true moral responsibility. 
That action-forfeitures can be rationally-performed actions is obvious enough.  The 
smoker who consciously chooses not to smoke a cigarette will be able to point to his reasons for 
not doing so.  He desires to live a long, healthy, and productive life and he believes abstaining 
from cigarettes will help him to achieve this, for example.  The man who decides not to stop for 
gas the moment his gas light comes on will have reasons for not doing so.  Perhaps he believes 
he will make it to his destination without stopping, he believes not stopping will allow him to get 
to his destination sooner, and he desires to get to his destination as quickly as possible.  Nina, the 
shy woman who discovered that her neighbor’s headlights were on, will also have reasons for not 
knocking on her neighbor’s door to notify him.  She believes it would be an awkward situation, 
                                                                                                                                                             
mutually entailing.  I believe my entire thesis may be rendered in terms of endorsements rather than choices, if my 
reader should find it beneficial. 
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and she believes she can satisfy her desire to solve the headlight problem without knocking on 
his door. 
In many cases of action-forfeiture, however, there is a reason for the action-forfeiture that 
is unlike any of the reasons cited above.  In many cases, a concurrent action-commitment will 
itself be an important reason—perhaps even the only reason—for the agent’s action-forfeiture.  
That is, the agent makes an action-forfeiture in part or entirely because of the action-
commitment.  This is especially true in cases where an agent is torn between two or more equally 
appealing courses of action.  The agent reaches a decision and forfeits some course of action, but 
the reason for doing so will consist primarily of the agent’s commitment to some other course of 
action.  As a reminder, this does not mean the action-commitment and the action-forfeiture really 
are one and the same choice.  Rather, one provides a reason for the other, even though the two 
come about simultaneously. 
It is important to recognize action-commitments as providing possible reasons 
explanations for action-forfeitures because it allows us to see how action-forfeitures escape the 
threat of infinite regress posed by the Basic Argument.  This is vital to my argument.  Recall 
that, for Strawson, an action must be both self-determined and based on reasons that are, at least 
in part, self-determined in order for an agent to be truly morally responsible for that action.  In 
chapter 3, it was determined that a primary reason Strawson has for withholding self-
determination from an agent’s actions is because he presupposes that one’s reasons cause one’s 
actions.  This was shown to be questionable, so the infinite regress now appears to be the only 
real threat to true moral responsibility that Strawson has offered.  It follows that, if an agent’s 
action-forfeiture is done for reasons that are (at least in part) not subject to the problem of 
infinite regress, then the agent may very well be truly morally responsible for that action-
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forfeiture.  I assert that, with at least some action-forfeitures, it will be the case that a concurrent 
action-commitment provides a reason—a very significant and non-regressive reason—for that 
action-forfeiture. 
Recall Ronny, the businessman who deliberates between Chinese food and sandwiches 
for lunch.  Let us change the example slightly and say that Ronny was quite torn about which 
food to get.  On the one hand, he loves sandwiches and wholeheartedly believes he will enjoy his 
lunch if that is what he decides to get.  On the other hand, he wants to try the new Chinese place 
and trusts that the terrific reviews it has been receiving are indicative of its culinary quality.  He 
believes either option will be equally satisfying.  He opts for the Chinese food. 
Question: why did Ronny forfeit sandwiches?  Answer: he decided to get Chinese food.  
That seems to be the primary reason, at least, given that Ronny believes Chinese food and 
sandwiches would be equally satisfying.  We might try to say that Ronny must have wanted 
Chinese food more than he wanted sandwiches, since he ultimately decided on Chinese food, but 
this is akin to saying that Ronny’s reasons in favor of eating Chinese food were “stronger than” 
his reasons in favor of getting a sandwich.  I argued in chapter 3 that such an explanation is 
unacceptable.  Additionally, Ronny himself needn’t believe he wanted Chinese food more than 
he wanted sandwiches.  If we were to ask Ronny, on the basis of evidence, “So, you wanted 
Chinese food more than you wanted a sandwich?” it is not absurd to think he would answer, 
“Not really.  They both sounded great.”  Even though I think it can be correct to say, in certain 
situations, that an agent’s desiring one course of action more than another explains why the agent 
commits and forfeits as she does, nothing demands that this is always the case.  Sometimes the 
actions that are forfeited will be desired just as much the actions to which the agent commits. 
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We then might ask Ronny, “So why did you get Chinese food?” and Ronny would reply, 
“Because it sounded good.  I’d heard good things about it.  I wanted to try it.”  The temptation at 
this point is to transfer these reasons for Ronny’s getting Chinese food to his sandwich-eating 
action-forfeiture, assuming that the same set of reasons can explain both choices.  To some 
extent this might work, for it may very well be that those reasons provide some of the reasons for 
Ronny’s not getting a sandwich, if Ronny holds them as such.19  But they will not provide a 
complete rational explanation for the forfeiture.  What must also be included, at the very least, is 
the fact that Ronny chose to eat Chinese.  Without this additional reason in place, the rational 
explanation of Ronny’s sandwich-eating action-forfeiture is lacking.  Its absence would suggest 
that Ronny’s actually choosing to eat Chinese food is irrelevant to his giving up the sandwich, 
and that is absurd.  If Ronny discovered that the Chinese restaurant did not accept credit cards 
and it just so happened that he did not have any cash on hand, for example, it would still be the 
case that Ronny thinks Chinese food sounds good, that he holds certain beliefs about the new 
Chinese restaurant’s quality based on the positive reviews he has heard, and that he wants to try 
the restaurant someday.  But presumably those reasons would not be enough to explain why 
Ronny does not get a sandwich at that point.  And that is because the action-commitment to eat 
Chinese, though itself largely explainable in terms of the Chinese restaurant’s appeal, is an 
essential part of the reasons explanation for Ronny’s sandwich-eating action-forfeiture and 
cannot be ignored. 
                                                 
19 Strawson says that a full, rational explanation—one that can be said to fully determine an agent’s actions—will be 
one based on reasons the agent actually has at the time of action, not just reasons that it is possible for an agent to 
have and that could make the agent’s actions intelligible to someone else (1986: 34n12, 35-37).  For example, the 
health benefits of vitamin C could very well be considered a reason for eating oranges, but it is not true that every 
person who eats an orange does so for, or is even aware of, this reason.  For these agents, the health benefits of 
vitamin C will not be a part of their reasons explanation for eating oranges. 
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On the flipside, Ronny’s action-commitment to eat Chinese food cannot wholly be 
explained without reference to his sandwich-eating action-forfeiture.  That is, a crucial reason 
that Ronny commits to eating Chinese food is that he has forfeited the only other food that 
tempts him—sandwiches.  Think of it in terms of beliefs and desires, which are what Strawson 
generally considers reasons to be.  Ronny believes he will not eat a sandwich for lunch.  Why 
not?  In part because he believes he will eat Chinese food for lunch.  But the opposite is equally 
true.  That is, why does Ronny believe he will eat Chinese food for lunch?  Because he now 
believes he is not going to eat a sandwich.  While it is true that Ronny would not likely cite his 
sandwich-eating action-forfeiture if someone were to ask him why he ordered Chinese food, this 
is only because it would already be understood that Ronny had forfeited everything else under 
consideration.  There just isn’t a need to bring up the action-forfeiture in most situations!  This is 
not because Ronny’s sandwich-eating action-forfeiture fails to factor into Ronny’s action-
commitment to eating Chinese food, but because it simply goes without saying, once we know 
Ronny has committed to eating Chinese food, that he has forfeited anything else he had been 
considering. 
I suspect that some of my readers will accept that an action-commitment can explain an 
action-forfeiture, but not vice versa.  Admittedly, claiming that an action-forfeiture can be part of 
one’s reasons for an action-commitment is somewhat counterintuitive.  Some will accept only 
that the forfeiture is, under the circumstances, logically necessary for the commitment.  But I 
propose that some mental state X can be regarded as a reason for some action-commitment C, if 
it is true that the agent performs C with X in mind and, prior to committing to C, the agent would 
accept (if the agent were to think about it) the conditional statement, “If I commit to C, it will be 
because X.”  This schema seems to account for Ronny’s other reasons for eating Chinese food.  
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That is, during deliberation, Ronny would presumably accept the statement, “If I commit to 
eating Chinese food, it will be because Chinese food tastes good, because I believe the good 
reviews I’ve heard about the new Chinese restaurant nearby,” and so on.  But he would also 
accept the statement, “If I commit to eating Chinese food, it will because I forfeit getting 
sandwiches for lunch.”  As I see it, so long as X can be regarded as a mental state, whenever X 
fits this mold in relation to some action-commitment C, X can be properly regarded as a reason 
for C.20 
At this point, it can be shown that Ronny’s sandwich-eating action-forfeiture (and 
Chinese-food-eating commitment, for that matter) evades the problem of infinite regress inherent 
in the Basic Argument.  One of the primary reasons that make up Ronny’s rational explanation 
for not getting a sandwich is Ronny’s action-commitment to eat Chinese food.  In order for the 
regress to start, then, the rational explanation of Ronny’s action-commitment to eat Chinese food 
would have to be traceable, in its entirety, to reasons Ronny had prior to the action-commitment 
itself.  This would not be enough for an infinite regress, of course, but it is how such a regress 
would begin.  As it turns out, many of the reasons Ronny has for eating Chinese food do precede 
his action-commitment, such as Ronny’s belief that the Chinese food will taste good.  But not all 
of Ronny’s reasons for committing to eat Chinese food appear prior to the commitment itself.  
Ronny’s action-commitment is also explained by Ronny’s sandwich-eating action-forfeiture.  
Ronny was not committed to eating Chinese food until he gave up the idea of eating sandwiches, 
but he did not give up the idea of eating sandwiches until he committed to eating Chinese food.  
These two distinct choices appear simultaneously, and they both factor into the rational 
                                                 
20 That X must be a mental state, something like a belief or a desire, is of extreme importance.  This is because it will 
not be the case that one of Ronny’s reasons for committing to eat Chinese food is that his credit card does not get 
rejected, even though Ronny would, hypothetically, accept the conditional statement, “If I commit to eating Chinese 
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explanation of the other.  Thus, a full rational explanation of Ronny’s sandwich-eating action-
forfeiture (and Chinese-food-eating action-commitment) includes reasons that came into being 
only at the moment the decision was made.  There is no regress. 
 
4.4 Action-Forfeitures and Self-Determination 
I have now argued that some cases of action-forfeitures and action-commitments can 
avoid the Basic Argument’s threat of infinite regress.  It has also been shown in chapter 3 that 
reasons should not be assumed to be causal.  An obvious question at this point is, what of self-
determination?  Can it be achieved?  Has Ronny achieved it?  Given my understanding of 
Strawson’s argument, I no longer see a reason to preclude self-determination from an agent in a 
situation like Ronny’s.  Premise (3) of the Basic Argument states, “To be self-determined in 
one’s reasons, one must have consciously and explicitly chosen to have (at least some of) those 
reasons and be self-determined in having made the choice to have those reasons.”  It is the latter 
half of this requirement for self-determination that is meant to lead to infinite regress, since to be 
self-determined in one’s choices, one must be self-determined in one’s reasons for making those 
choices.  Such was the gist of premise (4), which leads back to premise (3).  But there is no 
regress with Ronny’s choices to eat Chinese food and forfeit eating sandwiches, and these are 
both conscious and explicit choices Ronny makes.  So what else must be accomplished for 
Ronny to achieve self-determination? 
To answer this question, it may be helpful to modify premise (3) in such a way that it 
captures the concerns of premise (4).  I believe this can be done by substituting (3*) for (3): 
                                                                                                                                                             
food, it will be because my credit card does not get rejected,” and even though Ronny might be aware of this fact at 
the time he eats his Chinese food. 
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(3*) To be self-determined in one’s reasons, one must have consciously and 
explicitly chosen to have (at least some of) those reasons and it must be that this 
choice cannot wholly be explained by reference to reasons that were either (a) not 
consciously and explicitly chosen, or (b) traceable back to reasons that were not 
consciously and explicitly chosen. 
This is a verbose premise, but it seems to capture Strawson’s overall concerns about infinite 
regress in one fell swoop.  It also makes it easier to see that Ronny has indeed satisfied the 
requirements for self-determining his reasons.  Hence, on the basis of premise (2) of the Basic 
Argument (“To be truly responsible for one’s actions, one must be self-determined in one’s 
reasons for performing that action”), Ronny is truly responsible both for not getting a sandwich 
and for eating Chinese food.  He has made both choices consciously and explicitly, and because 
each choice is part of the rational explanation for the other, not all of Ronny’s reasons can be 
traced back to beliefs and desires that he had prior to making those choices. 
Deciding what to eat for lunch is not ideal for demonstrating moral responsibility, of 
course, but it is now easy enough to see how other scenarios will pan out.  Suppose some agent 
Mark has promised to take his nephew to the movies.  Mark is an avid fan of the movies, and he 
really enjoys spending time with his nephew, so fulfilling this promise is not something Mark 
considers to be a burden.  However, just before Mark is about to go pick up his nephew, his 
friends call and invite him to go with them to the movie.  Mark would like to hang out with his 
friends, and though he knows he has promised to go with his nephew, he considers going with 
his friends instead.  After a few moments of deliberation, Mark decides to go with his friends.  
Mark’s nephew excitedly awaits the arrival of his uncle, who never shows up. 
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What are Mark’s reasons for not going to the movie with his nephew?  One primary 
reason is that he intends to go to the movie with his friends.  But why does Mark intend to go to 
the movie with his friends?  In part because he no longer plans to go to the movie with his 
nephew.  Each distinct choice is explained, at least partially, by the other, preventing an infinite 
regress of reasons for why Mark has made the choices he has made.  Though Mark has reasons 
both for going with his friends and for going with his nephew that exist prior to his making a 
decision, neither set of pre-existent reasons sufficiently explain his choices.  Mark would not 
commit to going to the movie with his friends if he were still open to the idea of going with his 
nephew, and he would not give up on going with his nephew if he did not intend to go with his 
friends.  Nothing about this scenario entails that Mark does not make these choices consciously 
and explicitly, however, and so it appears that Mark is truly morally responsible for going to the 
movies with his friends and for breaking his promise to his nephew. 
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5 Final Thoughts 
The weaknesses of Strawson’s Basic Argument have now been exploited.  Strawson 
argues that, because one’s reasons determine one’s actions, one needs to be self-determined in 
one’s reasons in order to be self-determined in the actions to which those reasons lead.  In 
chapter 3, I argued that the tenability of such a claim is rooted in the notion that reasons are 
causal.  I then gave support to the idea that reasons are not causal and argued that we should not 
presume that a causal connection between one’s reasons and one’s actions exist in light of this 
contrary evidence.  Though the arguments in chapter 3 should have undermined the first move in 
Strawson’s argument, I recognized that some would hold to Strawson’s concerns about infinite 
regress even in the absence of the causal assumptions that were ultimately meant to instigate 
those concerns.  Thus, in chapter 4, I provided evidence for Strawson’s own belief that what I 
call action-forfeitures are actions, and I then argued that an agent’s action-commitments can 
sometimes play a vital role in the reasons explanation of the agent’s action-forfeiture (and vice 
versa).  Because action-commitments and action-forfeitures rationally sustain each other, as it 
were, the rationally-based infinite regress inherent in Strawson’s Basic Argument was 
circumvented.  I concluded chapter 4 by contending that, in the absence of both reasons-
causation and infinite regress, some agents appear to meet the criteria for self-determination, and 
hence for true moral responsibility, that Strawson puts forth. 
Undoubtedly, there will be some objections to my account.  The first part of this chapter 
will be dedicated to the entertaining and subsequent dispatching of some of these objections.  I 
will then conclude with a final thought on what this theory leaves open for investigation and why 
it may be pointing us in the right direction.  
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5.1 Objections 
Objection #1: True Moral Responsibility is Limited to Cases Where One is Equally Torn 
Between Two or More Courses of Action 
In the case of Ronny which made up the bulk of my argument in chapter 4, I stated that 
Ronny was equally torn between having sandwiches for lunch and having Chinese food for 
lunch.  Because he viewed the two choices as equally appealing, I said that nothing about one 
course of action would obviously explain why he gave up the other without also bringing in the 
fact that Ronny had actually committed to that other course of action.  Thus, some might suppose 
that I am limiting true moral responsibility only to cases where one is equally torn between two 
or more courses of action. 
In actuality, the only reason I chose to present a case wherein two courses of action were 
considered equally appealing was for philosophical convenience.  That is, in the case of Ronny, 
for example, making his options equally appealing prevented Ronny’s reasons for forfeiting 
sandwiches from getting “muddied.”  Suppose Ronny had believed that the Chinese restaurant 
was supposed to serve food far better tasting than his favorite sandwiches.  If that were the case, 
then one might suppose that Ronny forfeited sandwiches because he believed Chinese food 
would taste better.  This might be true, at least in part, and it’s certainly true that when we speak 
to one another, we often cite only one or two primary reasons for what we do, such that Ronny 
might have casually listed his belief that Chinese food would taste better as the reason he did not 
get sandwiches.21  But imagine how strange of a reason this would be if Ronny did not also 
intend to get Chinese food.  Because Ronny is considering only sandwiches or Chinese food, a 
belief that Chinese food will taste better than a sandwich will only explain why Ronny forfeits 
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sandwiches if he is already committed to eating Chinese.  It is possible of course for Ronny to 
believe Chinese food will taste better but not yet be committed to eating it (perhaps because it is 
more expensive, for example), but in such a case, it will be baffling for Ronny to forfeit the 
sandwiches without having committed to the only other food under consideration. 
The bottom line is that it does not matter if situations exist wherein the reasons in favor 
of one course of action allow one to rule out another course of action without committing to that 
first course of action.  Perhaps Ronny is considering Chinese food, sandwiches, and pizza, and 
perhaps he believes the pizza parlor will be the slowest to deliver his food.  In such a situation, 
he may forfeit pizza without explicitly committing either to sandwiches or Chinese food.  But the 
fact remains that, in situations where an action-forfeiture does explain an action-commitment and 
vice versa, infinite regress will be avoided.  These need not be cases where two courses of action 
are considered equally appealing, so long as both courses of action are given consideration.  
Giving up one for the other, even if it seems like the obvious thing to do, may still allow the 
action-commitment and the action-forfeiture to partially explain each other.  These are the types 
of cases where the Basic Argument loses efficacy and the possibility of true moral responsibility 
emerges. 
 
Objection #2: This Theory Accommodates Only Libertarians 
Another possible objection is that my argument is inherently libertarian, such that it 
cannot benefit compatibilists.  This objection (although I’m not sure it actually constitutes an 
objection) might be fueled by the fact that I utilize Ginet, himself a libertarian, for one of the 
main thrusts of my argument, namely that reasons are not causal.  Another reason my argument 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 Compare this to the person who explains why he opted for steak over lobster by saying, “The steak is cheaper.”  
Presumably he did not order steak merely because it was cheaper than lobster.  Presumably, it will also be the case 
48 
may be considered libertarian is that, when an agent freely performs an action-forfeiture, I am 
ultimately claiming that her reasons for doing so may appear at the very same moment she 
performs it.  This in and of itself does not make my theory a libertarian one, but it may be 
construed as a bit too “magical” for some people’s liking.  (Libertarianism is often accused of 
being inherently mysterious.) 
I can understand these concerns, yet, like Strawson, I have tried to keep my argument 
“non-partisan,” such that it works whether determinism or indeterminism is true.  Above all else, 
I have aimed for accuracy, and I truly believe that agents often forfeit one course of action in part 
because they are committed to another, that agents often commit to one course of action in part 
because they have forfeited any others, and that these decisions can happen simultaneously even 
though they genuinely explain each other.  I see nothing about this that is inconsistent with 
determinism.  What the objector may really be wondering is if a non-causal account of reasons is 
compatible with a deterministic universe.  I resolutely answer yes.  I believe that, if determinism 
is true, our actions are likely caused by the same (presumably physical) states and laws that 
cause us to believe we have certain reasons for performing those actions.  This type of 
determinism does not mean that the reasons themselves cause the actions, of course.  It just 
means that we are incredibly fortunate that, most of the time at least, our actions make sense to 
us in light of our reasons.  An advantage of this type of determinism is that it could also explain 
those times when we don’t feel like our actions make sense even to ourselves, such as when we 
feel out of control, irrational, and/or simply weak-willed.  
In the end, it does not matter if this theory of determinism is correct.  What matters is that 
the theory shows one possible way in which a non-causal account of reasons is compatible with 
                                                                                                                                                             
that he thought steak would taste good, that he believed he could afford the steak, etc. 
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determinism, and hence one possible way in which my thesis can be regarded as a compatibilist 
one. 
 
Objection #3: This Theory Makes Action-Commitments and Action-Forfeitures Appear Random. 
Some might insist that, if Ronny (or Mark, or any other agent in a relevantly similar 
situation) cannot give a reasons explanation for why he opted for one course of action over 
another (and not just for why he opted for a particular course of action and, apart from that, why 
he forfeited some other course of action), his choice must be random, at least from a rational 
standpoint, which is what we have been concerned with thus far. 
The only way I know how to respond to this type of objection is to ask for a more precise 
definition of “random.”  Time and again, Strawson contrasts “random” with “determined,” 
suggesting that the two are mere opposites of one another (see, for instance, 1986: 8, 25-26).  
But, in his effort to appease one and all kinds of philosophers, he has given such varied 
definitions of “determined” that it makes the precise interpretation of “random” somewhat 
difficult to come by.  On the one hand, Strawson clearly thinks of “determined” as meaning 
“caused,” so if “random” is just the opposite of “caused,” then uncaused actions are, by 
Strawson’s definition, random.  But nothing in my theory relies on one’s actions being uncaused.  
I merely argue that reasons should not be presumed to cause one’s actions.  If that alone is 
enough to make an agent’s actions random (as far as her reasons are concerned), so be it.  
Granting this to Strawson will not prevent the fact that an agent sometimes (a) consciously 
knows what she is choosing, (b) has reasons for choosing what she is choosing, (c) is aware of 
those reasons for choosing what she is choosing, and (d) believes she is choosing as she is 
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choosing because of those reasons.  If Strawson wants to call this type of choice “random,” that 
is his prerogative.  To me, it seems a poor word choice. 
 As it turns out, I do not think Strawson would, should, or consistently could consider 
these choices to be random.  Strawson says an agent’s actions are (rationally speaking) fully 
determined if the agent has a full, rational explanation for that action.  As has already been 
shown, Ronny’s and Mark’s choices do have full, rational explanations.  If their actions are 
thereby fully determined, then surely they cannot be random if “random” is just the opposite of 
“determined.”  Funny enough, it is Strawson’s account of how reasons fully determine one’s 
actions that most strongly indicates that Ronny’s and Mark’s (and Nina’s, etc.) actions are 
anything but random.  Because these actions satisfy the requirements for being fully determined, 
I suppose they would also have to be fully not random.  If Strawson himself has articulated a 
theory wherein these agents are not acting randomly, then I do not see how claiming these 
actions are random will help Strawson.  Insisting that these actions are random will merely 
undermine Strawson as well. 
 
5.2 Just the Beginning 
I have now spent several chapters arguing that freedom and moral responsibility may be 
linked to an agent’s conscious decision not to do something.  The purpose of this thesis was to 
refute Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument, but it is my hope that I have accomplished more than 
that.  Humbly, I hope that I have opened the door to a more comprehensive examination of 
agential freedom, one that looks not only at what an agent consciously commits herself to doing, 
but at what she knowingly gives up in the process.  I believe there is something important to be 
discovered here.  Consider the fact that what I have called action-forfeitures are seemingly 
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unique to mentally-mature human beings.  We do not generally suppose that small children, 
those with certain mental impairments, and non-human animals are consciously aware of what 
they do not do.  For instance, the lion pouncing on a gazelle is not typically presumed to be 
cognizant of the fact, as he pounces, that he has forfeited the option of attacking other gazelles.  
Interestingly, these groups are also those that are often denied the status of acting freely and 
morally responsibly.  Something tells me this is not a coincidence, and that a great deal is to be 
discovered in looking at the twofold nature of choice that I have only begun to touch upon in this 
thesis.  It is my hopes that we, as philosophers, will not forfeit the opportunity to study these 
issues further. 
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